Government Expenditure in Nigeria: Determinants and Trends by Akanbi, Olusegun Ayodele
ISSN 2039-2117 (online) 
ISSN 2039-9340 (print) 
        Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 
            MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 
Vol 5 No 27 
December  2014 
          
 98 
 
Government Expenditure in Nigeria: Determinants and Trends 
 
Olusegun Ayodele Akanbi 
 
Associate Professor (Economics), University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa 
Postal Address: Economics Department, PO Box 392 UNISA South Africa, 0003 
Email: akanboa@unisa.ac.za and segakanbi@yahoo.co.uk  
 
Doi:10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n27p98 
 
Abstract 
 
This study empirically examines the pattern and drivers of government expenditure with specific reference to capital and 
recurrent expenditure in Nigeria. The study employs a public choice framework and the model is estimated with time-series 
data from 1974 to 2012, using the Johansen estimation technique. The results show that capital and recurrent expenditure are 
resilient to shocks in total government spending and, similarly, total government expenditure is found to be resilient to shocks in 
capital and recurrent spending. However, whereas total and capital expenditure tend to be resilient to shocks in government 
revenue, recurrent expenditure is found to be significantly affected by shocks in government revenue. The effects of 
governance show that recurrent expenditure is not affected by any elements of poor governance as much as are capital and 
overall expenditure. Increased per capita income was found to be in support of Wagner’s law, given the response of total and 
capital expenditure, but this law was refuted by the recurrent expenditure response.  
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1. Introduction and Background 
 
Government expenditure remains an important demand management tool and, if well-managed, it could put an economy 
on a long-term sustainable growth and development trajectory. Prudent government spending, through an efficient 
allocation of its resources to the different sectors of the economy, translates into an inclusive and sustainable growth 
pattern, which serves as a driver for eradicating poverty and inequality within society. 
The pattern of government expenditure in Nigeria over the years has to a large extent been driven by crude oil 
endowment, which is reflected in the generated revenue (Akanbi, 2014). This study aims to establish the determinants of 
government expenditure, by further disaggregating expenditure into two components: capital and recurrent expenditure.  
The empirical literature on the determinants of government expenditure is vast, with varying techniques and 
methodologies adopted in their investigations. Many of these empirical studies focus on the determinants of military 
spending (Davoodi, Clements, Schiff & Debaere, 2001; De Masi & Lorie, 1989; Schiff, Gupta & Clements, 1998; Gupta, 
Sanjeev, McDonald& Ruggiero, 1998; Hewitt, 1991, 1992 & 1993), since military expenditure absorbs more than 5 
percent of world resources annually. Related studies investigated for Nigeria (Taiwo, 1989; Babatunde, 2011; Aregbeyen 
& Akpan, 2013) suggest that per capita income, government revenue, demographics and institutional variables are 
significant determinants of government expenditure. These variables are in line with existing empirical literature and have 
also been included in this study. However, the distinctive feature of this study, compared to other empirical work carried 
for Nigeria, is the adoption of the public choice framework in estimating the determinants of government expenditure. The 
study aims to augment the literature by looking at allocational expenditure priorities in Nigeria, with a specific focus on 
capital and recurrent expenditure. The hypothesis is, therefore, to investigate the drivers behind these spending 
allocations.  
The evolution of government expenditure in Nigeria has revealed some basic trends over the years with regard to 
the patterns of capital, recurrent and total government expenditure. Figure 1 (Panels A & B) shows the percentage share 
of capital and recurrent expenditure in total government expenditure, and their percentage growth rates as a share of 
GDP. Panel A reveals the divergence and convergence of capital and recurrent expenditure in total government 
expenditure. In the 70s (a period of massive physical infrastructure building), capital expenditure was on the rise, 
reaching its peak in 1980 at about a 55 percent share, while recurrent expenditure fell to about a 45 percent share of total 
government spending. Thereafter, a reverse trend ensued, with capital spending reaching a trough of about 41 percent 
and recurrent spending peaking at about 59 percent. From 1990, the rising trend in capital spending and falling trend in 
recurrent spending converged with equal shares in 1998, which happened to be the end of the deregulation period. 
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Earlier convergence in the two components of expenditure was reported in 1976 and 1983, with the latter year almost 
coinciding with the beginning of a structural adjustment programme (SAP). However, since the return to a democratic 
dispensation in 1999, there has been an increasing divergence between capital and recurrent expenditure, with capital 
expenditure falling to about a 22 percent share, while recurrent expenditure has risen to about a 78 percent share, as at 
2012. The average shares in total government expenditure over the period 1970 to 2012 amount to 42 percent and 58 
percent for capital and recurrent expenditure respectively.  
 
Figure 1: Government Expenditure Performance in Nigeria 
 
 
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (July 2014) 
 
The total government expenditure growth and capital expenditure growth have revealed similar trends over the years 
(Panel B). After rising to a peak in the mid-1970s, the trend in annual growth rate of capital and total government 
expenditure has fallen, reaching negative growths of about 16 percent and 6 percent of GDP respectively in 2012. On the 
other hand, the trend in annual growth rate of recurrent expenditure as a share of GDP has been positive for most years, 
although not growing beyond a 5 percent trend level. A negative growth of about 1.1 percent was recorded in 1970, and 
between 2007 and 2012 recurrent spending has grown negatively on average by about 0.9 percent. However, the 
average growth in the trend of capital, recurrent and total government expenditure as a share of GDP over the period 
1970 to 2012 amounts to 5.4 percent, 2.3 percent and 1.8 percent respectively.1 The question then is what drives 
expenditure priorities and are there any common characteristics to be found in such expenditure allocation decisions in 
the Nigerian economy? This study is limited to expenditure patterns only as reflected in capital, recurrent and total 
expenditures.  
Against this background, Nigeria’s government expenditure function was specified and estimated. The results of 
the estimates are mixed and suggest that a disaggregation is necessary when estimating the determinants of government 
expenditure.  
The rest of the study is organised as follows: section two presents the theoretical framework, methodology and 
estimation techniques adopted in the study, as well as the data analysis, while section three contains an analysis of the 
various estimation results. Section four concludes the study.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework, Methodology and Data  
 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
 
The framework used in this study follows a public choice approach similar to that used by Hewitt (1991, 1992, 1993), 
Davoodi et.al (2001), Nyamongo (2007) and Akanbi and Schoeman (2010). The model analyses the relationship between 
government capital (infrastructure) spending, recurrent spending and overall government spending. Previous studies 
                                                                            
1 Note: Figure 1 depicts the trend of these variables and is calculated using a Hodrick-Prescott Filter. 
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mostly used the public choice model to analyse the relationship between military spending and overall government 
spending, in which the former is regarded as pure public good. A slight deviation from this is seen in Akanbi and 
Schoeman (2010), where the relationship between education spending and overall government spending is explored. 
Therefore, what distinguishes this study from previous studies is that it disaggregates capital and recurrent spending from 
overall government spending, rather than the split of military and education spending from overall government spending 
in the previous studies. Thus, the determination of capital and recurrent expenditures is modelled as a government 
optimisation problem, meaning that the decision on the size of a budget for capital and recurrent expenditure is taken by 
the political leadership. 
Assuming the welfare function of the government to be as follows: 
W = f (P, C, R, Z),      (1) 
Where 
P = private consumption; 
C = government capital spending; 
R = government recurrent spending; and 
Z = state variables (i.e. GDP per capita, government revenue, governance index, population and urbanisation 
index, etc.) 
The government’s choice of the level of capital and overall government spending is affected by the state variables. 
Overall government spending is represented by the following equation: 
G = C + R.       (2) 
Abstracting from private investment and the external account, the budget constraint is determined by the available 
resources in the economy: 
G = Y – P,       (3) 
where Y represents the value of gross domestic product. 
To get a simple analytical solution, a Cobb-Douglas specification for equation (1) is assumed, while abstracting 
from the presence of state variables. Thus, 
W = .       (4) 
Choices of G, C and R that maximise equation (4) subject to equations (2) and (3) will result in2: 
G =        (5) 
and 
C =        (6) 
while  
R =        (7) 
Equations (5), (6) and (7) show the simultaneous relationship between the two categories of spending and overall 
government spending. Higher capital and recurrent spending will lead to higher overall spending and vice versa. Allowing 
for the state variables to enter the equations, results in the following equations: 
 ,      (8) 
 ,      (9) 
       (10) 
Equations (8), (9) and (10) form a structural model.  
In line with the existing empirical specification, the econometric models are specified in natural logarithms, based 
on equations (8), (9) and (10), which are presented below: 
   (11)  
  (12)  
   (13)  
where  
ypc = real per capita GDP,  
rev = government revenue 
                                                                            
2 The solution for the optimal choice of C, R and G is shown in Appendix 1. 
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pop = total population, 
gov = governance index, 
ur = urbanization ratio, 
lfpr = labour force participation rate. 
The state variables specified in the above equations include the real per capita GDP, total population, governance 
index, government revenue, labour force participation rate and urbanization ratio. These variables are assumed to 
influence the parameters of the different categories of government expenditure, similar to the approach followed by 
Davoodi et.al (2001), Hewitt and Van Rijckeghem (1995), Mauro (1998) and Heller, Peter and Diamond (1990).  
The directional effect from total government expenditure to the two categories of expenditure is found to be 
ambiguous. That is to say that, an increase in total government expenditure results in a corresponding rise in capital 
expenditure, but such a rise in overall government expenditure may also be directed towards recurrent expenditure in the 
budget. On the other hand, an increase in capital and/or recurrent expenditure is expected to result in an increase in total 
government expenditure.  
The GDP per capita, which serves as a measure of welfare or development, is expected to show evidence in 
favour of Wagner’s law. This means that a higher level of welfare is accompanied by an increase in government 
expenditure. However, in the literature, evidence in favour of this phenomenon is mixed (Easterly, William & Rebelo 
(1993); Rodrik & Dani (1996); and Commander, Simon, Hamid, Davoodi & Une (1997)). 
Considering the population structure and density that are used in this paper as evidence from Hewitt (1992), it is 
expected that the size of the urban population should correlate positively with capital expenditure. This is because the 
majority of active population will likely move to the urban centre where better physical infrastructure facilities are 
available, thereby leading to increased pressure on government to spend more on capital projects. Total population is 
also expected to correlate positively with overall government expenditure, since an increase in population size also 
results in an increase in both capital and recurrent government expenditure. Likewise the rise in active population (lfpr) 
will significantly increase government recurrent expenditure, mainly through salaries, wages and transfer payments.  
Poor governance (i.e. corruption and government ineffectiveness) which can be regarded as a symptom of bad 
management of a country’s resources will also affect expenditure priorities. A rise in the level of public expenditure and 
lower revenue as a result of corrupt systems may have adverse budgetary implications, resulting in poor infrastructure 
and public services. It is expected that a government with a poor governance structure will vote more funds to capital 
projects than to recurrent expenditure, where corrupt expenditure is less visible. This is because it might be easier to 
collect substantial bribes on large infrastructural projects such as road constructions, than on payment of workers’ 
salaries and wages. Also, overall government expenditure will rise as governance becomes weaker. The composition of 
government expenditure may be distorted, as corrupt and inefficient government officials choose to direct expenditure to 
other sectors that tend to favour bribery (Mauro, 1997; Akanbi & Schoeman, 2010). This is also similar with the effect of 
government revenue on the two components of government expenditure.  
 
3. Methodology  
 
As mentioned earlier, this study estimates the link between the categories (capital and recurrent) of government 
expenditure and overall government expenditure in Nigeria. In line with the Johansen (1988) cointegration estimation 
technique, as set out in Enders (2004:348), the reduced-form vector autoregression (VAR) of equations (11), (12) and 
(13) is re-specified as follows: 
     (14) 
where  is a vector of variables: 
  (15) 
Cholesky decomposition is used for orthogonalisation, which means that the Cholesky factor is lower triangular. 
Therefore, each variable in the vector is allowed to react contemporaneously to all variables above it. This means that the 
government expenditure variables will be affected contemporaneously by all the other variables.  
Based on the long-run relationship that is captured by the government expenditure model specified in equations 
(11), (12) and (13), a vector error correction model (VECM) of the following form is estimated to reveal the short-run 
dynamics:  
      (16) 
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The estimation procedure is as follows: Firstly, the reduced-form VAR in equation (14) is estimated and all the 
diagnostic tests are performed. Secondly, the Johansen cointegration test is performed and the cointegrating vectors and 
loading matrices are identified. Thirdly, a VECM (equation (16)) is estimated and the entire range of diagnostic tests is 
performed. 
 
3.1 Data analysis 
 
The data used in this study were obtained from the Central Bank of Nigeria, the World Bank Databank, African 
Development Indicators, and the International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics covering the period 
between 1974 and 2012. All data were measured in real terms (2005 prices) and local currency (Naira). The governance 
index was sourced from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. The methodology adopted in deriving index for 
governance for this study follows the line of thought in Akanbi (2012) when measuring governance. Given this, the 
worldwide governance indicators developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a) were utilised. The indices 
cover a broad range of policy and institutional outcomes for a large number of countries, and include the rule of law, 
corruption control, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, voice and accountability, and political instability. To 
capture governance in a broader context, the average value of the six elements in the governance indicators is used. See 
Akanbi (2012) for detailed analysis on derivation of governance series.  
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 Reduced-Form VAR Diagnostic Tests 
 
The reduced-form VAR is estimated. All the roots have modulus less than one and lie inside the unit circle. Table 1 shows 
other diagnostics tests for the VAR. The VAR passed all the diagnostic tests, revealing a well-specified model.  
 
Table 1: Diagnostic Test on the Reduced-Form VAR 
 
 Test DF Statistic P-value 
Serial correlation No serial correlation LM-Test-  (lag 2) 81 62.96 0.93 
Normality Normally distributed JB-Joint 18 17.37 0.50 
 Error term Kurtosis-Joint 9 6.24 0.71 
 Skewness-Joint 9 11.13 0.26 
Heteroscedasticity No heteroscedasticity 252 272.02 0.18 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from Eviews 8 
 
4.2 Cointegration test results  
 
Based on the above theoretical framework and the nature of the data-generating process of all the variables included, an 
appropriate model for the government expenditure in Nigeria was selected, and the results of the trace and maximum 
eigenvalue tests are presented in Table 2.3 To critically evaluate government expenditure pattern in Nigeria, four crucial 
periods4 as laid out in Akanbi (2011) need to be captured. These periods, however, constitute major structural breaks. In 
other to capture the structural breaks that arise from these crucial periods, a dummy variable was included as an 
exogenous variable in a VAR model. Four breaks were identified, with the beginning of each period (1975, 1985, 1994 
and 1999) denoted as 1, and 0 for the rest of the periods.  
To detect which version of the deterministic component should be used, the Pantula principle was adopted. The 
trace test identified four (4) cointegrating vectors, while the maximum eigenvalue test identified three (3) cointegrating 
vectors for a model with no constant or trend in the cointegrating equation (CE). In a conflicting cointegrating scenario 
                                                                            
3 The appropriate model does not allow for a linear deterministic trend in the data and estimate with no constant or trend in the 
cointegrating equation and VAR.   
4 The pre-Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) [1975–1984], the SAP era [1985–1993], the period of deregulation [1994–1998], and 
the return to a democratic dispensation [1999–2012]. 
1H 0H
2χ
2χ
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such as this, the maximum eigenvalue test is adopted when estimating the error correction model, as it has a sharper 
alternative hypothesis that pins down the number of cointegrating vectors (Enders, 2004:354).  
 
Table 2: Cointegration test results 
 
Trace tests Maximum eigenvalue tests 
  -Trace Stat. 5% CV   -Max Stat 5% CV 
r=0 r 1 291.8845* 179.5098 r=0 r=1 87.14510* 54.96577 
r 1 r 2 204.7394* 143.6691 r=1 r=2 61.90749* 48.87720 
r 2 r 3 142.8319* 111.7805 r=2 r=3 48.04288* 42.77219 
r 3 r 4 94.78898* 83.93712 r=3 r=4 34.77004 36.63019 
r 4 r 5 60.01894 60.06141 r=4 r=5 25.35072 30.43961 
r 5 r 6 34.66822 40.17493 r=5 r=6 16.51859 24.15921 
r 6 r 7 18.14963 24.27596 r=6 r=7 10.69747 17.79730 
r 7 r 8 7.452162 12.32090 r=7 r=8 7.144139 11.22480 
r 8 r 9 0.308024 4.129906 r=8 r=9 0.308024 4.129906 
*denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from Eviews 8 
 
4.3 Long-run VECM results  
 
Using the maximum eigenvalue cointegrating test results, the long-run part of the VECM is presented in equation (17). 
After imposing the necessary restrictions, the long-run cointegrating vector identified the overall government expenditure, 
government capital expenditure and recurrent expenditure, which are the equations of interest in this study. In order to 
fully identify all cointegrating vectors, and be in line with equations (11), (12) and (13), nine restrictions were applied to 
the long-run part of the VECM. The first, second and third CEs represent total government expenditure, capital 
expenditure and recurrent expenditure equations respectively. These three variables were restricted to one in the long-
run part of the VECM. In addition to this, six restrictions were applied to the long-run CEs. Urbanisation and labour force 
participation rate were restricted to zero in CE1, labour force participation rate and total population were restricted to zero 
in CE2, and urbanisation and total population were restricted to zero in CE3. In the short-run, however, urbanisation, 
labour force participation rate and total population were all restricted to zero in the three CEs. The restrictions on the 
short-run adjustment coefficients were based on the insignificant role that these variables are expected to play in the 
adjustment towards the long-run. 
 (17) 
where  and  represent the short-run and long-run coefficients of the VECMs respectively. The estimated long-
run government expenditure equations, after normalisation, are presented in Table 3, with the t-values in parentheses. 
 
 
oH 1H λ oH 1H λ
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Table 3: Estimated long-run results 
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variables
CE1: Overall government 
expenditure 
CE2: Capital 
expenditure 
CE3: Recurrent 
expenditure 
Overall government expenditure 2.0 [23.98]*** 2.2 [395.66]*** 
Capital expenditure 0.43 [40.52]*** -0.97 [-40.60]*** 
Recurrent expenditure 0.44 [332.02]*** -1.59 [-19.97]***  
Overall government revenue 0.02 [1.82]* 0.22 [3.50]*** -0.1 [-1.85]* 
Real per capita GDP 0.14 [7.99]*** 0.52 [4.17]*** -0.32 [-7.98]*** 
Governance -0.49 [-10.43]*** -0.24 [-1.37] 1.11 [10.54]*** 
Urbanisation Ratio 3.22 [6.10]***  
Labour force participation rate 0.13 [6.15]*** 
Total population 0.10 [6.34]***  
Note: *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 10% level
Source: Author’s Calculation from Eviews 8 
 
Note: Dependent variables indicate that they have been normalised to one (1) and the independent variables suggest that 
the signs of all other coefficient variables have been reverted so as to correspond to the theoretical specifications of 
equations 11, 12 and 13. 
The estimates presented in Table 3 are the average long-run coefficient estimates of the VECM. Estimates of the 
overall government expenditure equation (CE1) correspond to a priori expectations, except for governance variable, 
which shows the opposite effect. The effects of capital and recurrent expenditure on overall government spending are 
similar, indicating that both components of government expenditure have been growing almost at the same rate on 
average over the years. An increase in capital and recurrent expenditure by 1 percent will lead to about a 0.44 percent 
increase in overall government expenditure. On the other hand, the significance of the coefficients of the overall 
government expenditure (CE2 and CE3) shows that an increase by 1 percent in total government spending will lead to an 
increase of about 2 percent and 2.2 percent in capital and recurrent expenditure respectively. This also indicates that 
both expenditure components will have to reflect twice the changes in overall government expenditure. 
The decision to increase capital spending in a particular period will directly translate into a reduction in recurrent 
expenditure, and vice-versa. This is revealed in the dual-causality effects of capital and recurrent expenditure in CE2 and 
CE3. An increase in recurrent expenditure by 1 percent will lead to about a 1.6 percent decrease in capital expenditure, 
and when capital expenditure increases by 1 percent, recurrent expenditure will also fall by about 1 percent (Table 3). 
The direction from changes in recurrent expenditure to changes in capital expenditure is found to be more elastic than 
from changes in capital expenditure to recurrent expenditure. However, this revealed that expenditure reallocations will 
be balanced by changes in capital expenditure rather than recurrent expenditure.  
Changes in overall government revenue will have a positive effect on overall government spending and capital 
expenditure, but the effect will be negative on the recurrent expenditure component. From the result in Table 3, a 1 
percent increase in government revenue will lead to about a 0.02 percent and 0.22 percent increase in overall 
government expenditure and capital expenditure respectively. On the other hand, government recurrent expenditure 
declines by about 0.1 percent when overall government revenue rises by 1 percent. The small magnitude found for the 
coefficient of overall government expenditure can be attributed to the net effects of the coefficients of both capital and 
recurrent expenditure. The negative effect of the changes in government revenue on recurrent expenditure could be 
associated with reallocation of resources to areas that are susceptible to corrupt practices (i.e. capital expenditure 
projects) and thereby not able to meet up with the increasing rate of recurrent expenditure. However, one of the 
consequential effects of this will be a shrinking and ineffective public service delivery.  
The significance of real per capita GDP in the overall government expenditure and capital expenditure equations 
(CE1 and CE2) shows that the higher the welfare level of a country, the more that country spends on capital projects. The 
coefficients show that a 1 percent increase in real per capita income will lead to about 0.14 percent and 0.52 percent 
increases in overall and capital spending. However, in the case of the recurrent expenditure equation (CE3), an increase 
in the per capita income by 1 percent results in the recurrent government spending falling by about 0.32 percent.  
The response of recurrent spending to the governance index shows that as the government pursues good 
governance, its spending on operations, wages and salaries, purchases of goods and services, and current grants and 
subsidies, rises. An improvement in the governance index by 1 unit, results in an increase in recurrent expenditure of 
about 1.1 percentage points. This is not surprising, since this expenditure component is not very attractive to politicians 
and/or bureaucrats attempting to promote their own personal interests. Similar results were found in Mauro (1997), who 
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nevertheless cautions readers not to interpret such expenditure as being free of corruption. However, the results seem to 
indicate that the level of corrupt practices in the education sector is much lower than in other sectors.  
The response of total government expenditure and capital expenditure to better governance is also in line with 
expectations. The significance of the governance index shows that as the governance index declines (poor governance) 
by 1 unit, total government expenditures and capital expenditure tend to rise by about 0.49 and 0.24 percentage points, 
respectively. In other words, a more corrupt and/or inefficient government will tend to increase its expenditure by either 
inflating its projects or choosing those that will be easier to levy bribes on. This is contrary to what is found in the case of 
recurrent spending, and could reflect the self-interest of politicians and bureaucrats.  
The population structure and density included in the estimations are in line with a priori expectations as far as the 
two expenditure components are concerned. The results reveal that a 1 percent increase in the total population size will 
increase total government spending by about 0.1 percent. The urbanisation ratios have a positive impact on capital 
spending. The results show that an increase in the urbanisation ratio by 1 percent will lead to an increase of about 3.2 
percent in capital expenditure. In the same way, when the labour force participation rate increases by 1 percent, recurrent 
expenditure by government also increases by about 0.13 percent.  
Table 4 presents the short-run adjustment coefficients (  values or loading matrices), which show the dynamic 
adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium path. As expected, the  values of the error-correction estimates are all 
greater than 0 in absolute values, except for the restricted coefficient. This implies that all the cointegrating vectors enter 
into the short-run determination of the Nigerian current account function and, therefore, they can be regarded as not 
being weakly exogenous (Enders, 2004:328).  
 
Table 4: Estimated loading matrices and weak exogeneity tests 
 
Variables   
CE1 -247.5(-2.86) 
-581.18
(-6.26) 
-26.04
(-0.20) 
-266.14
(-1.80) 
-79.44
(-1.17) 
-26.38
(-0.97) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CE2 -0.34(-0.94) 
-0.24
(-0.62) 
-0.57
(-1.05) 
0.44
(0.71) 
0.44
(1.56) 
-0.45
(-3.96) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CE3 -109.3(-2.86) 
-256.89
(-6.24) 
-11.97
(-0.21) 
-118.58
(-1.81) 
-35.03
(-1.16) 
-11.43
(-0.95) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source: Author’s calculations from Eviews 8 
 
Notes: t-statistics are given in brackets 
 
The likelihood ratio for binding restrictions is LR = 45.59 (0.00). The p-value is given in parentheses. This test pertains to 
both long-run and the above loading matrix restrictions. The negative signs of the loading factors indicate that the 
variables tend to bring the system back to its long-run equilibrium path, while the positive signs of the loading factors 
indicate that the variables tend to push the system away from its long-run equilibrium path. Almost all the variables played 
an important role in bringing the system back to its long-run equilibrium path, except for the government revenue and per 
capita GDP in CE2, which had positive signs.  
 
Figure 2: Cointegrating Relationships for Government Expenditure Equations 
 
 
The graphs of the estimated cointegrating relations of the VECM (in Table 3) are presented in Figure 2. The cointegrating 
relations were found to be appropriate, since the graphs reverted to the equilibrium (zero). 
χ
χ
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5. Conclusions 
 
This study investigates the impact of some selected variables on capital and recurrent government expenditure and total 
government expenditure in Nigeria. In order to fully detect the impact of the selected variables on government 
expenditure pattern, it was deemed appropriate to disaggregate total expenditure into capital and recurrent expenditure. 
The estimation performed portrays a robust estimate of the parameters in the models. The estimation was carried out 
using Johansen estimation technique.  
The impact of total government expenditure on capital and recurrent spending shows the expected results, namely, 
that the shares of both spending components to total government spending increase when fiscal policy is expansionary. 
This means that capital and recurrent expenditure are resilient to shocks in total government spending, and similarly, total 
government expenditure is found to be resilient to shocks in capital and recurrent spending. However, although total and 
capital expenditure tend to be resilient to shocks in government revenue, this is not the case for recurrent expenditure. 
The latter opposing result could be attributed to the tendency of being able to reallocate resources to areas that are 
susceptible to corrupt practices, such as capital projects.  
The positive, significant and robust relationship found between governance and recurrent spending also shows that 
this component of expenditure is not affected by any elements of governance (corruption and/or government 
ineffectiveness) as much as it does for capital expenditure. On the other hand, increased per capita income was found to 
be in support of the Wagner’s law in total and capital expenditure specifications, but this was refuted by the recurrent 
expenditure specification.  
Future research should attempt to correct some of the shortcomings of this study, such as the lack of available 
long-time series for governance, which resulted in the adoption of a transformation procedure used in an earlier study.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Forming a Langragian from (4) subject to (2) and (3). 
 
 
Since; C+R = Y-P 
F.O.C 
=  = 0   (1) 
= = 0    (2) 
=  = 0    (3) 
= Y - P - C – R = 0    (4) 
Equating (2) and (3) 
     (5) 
     (6) 
     (7) 
Substituting (6) into (4) 
Y – P – C –  = 0 
But Y – P = G 
G – (  = 0 
C =      (8) 
Again, substituting (7) into (4) 
Y – P –  - R = 0 
G – (  = 0 
R =  (9) 
Equating (1) and (2) 
     (10) 
Also, equating (1) and (3) 
     (11) 
Substituting (10) into (11) 
     (12) 
and 
 (13) 
Substituting (12) and (13) into (4) 
Y – P –  -  = 0 for Y = P+G 
Therefore, 
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